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JUDICIAL STATESMEN
Important Part Played by Decisions in Development of Law and Necessity for Training in
Socio-Economic Science to Fit Lawyers as Safe Guides for Our Social Future
By Jo HN BARKER WAITE
Professor of Law, University of Michigan
NOWLEDGE of the Common Law "doth noway conduce to the making of a statesman.
It is a confined and topicall kind of Learning
calculated only for the Meridian of Westminister-
Hall, and reacheth no further than Dover. Trans-
plant a Common Lawyer to Calice, and his head is
no more usefull there than a Sun-dyal in a grave."
So an anonymous individual placarded England,
some three hundred years ago, in protest against
the election of lawyers to Parliament'
It is unquestionably true, today, that knowl-
edge of the common law-in its customary con-
notation of precedent--does not in and of itself
make a statesman. It contributes thereto, but it7
does not accomplish the end. Statesmen are pilots
of the ship; they are the lookers-ahead, conceptors
of what ought to be. They shift the course to
avoid an evil or attain a good. They change old
laws and make new laws when the welfare of their
people so requires. They must know conditions as
they are; they must determine whether to retain
them or to change them. They direct the future
from a knowledge of the present and the past.
But the essence of the common law has been
a doctrine of theoretical immutability. "Common
Lawyers" are not ordinarily supposed to direct the
course of events, but merely to predict its direction
from the route marks of the past. Theoretically,
at least, they determine the continued course of the
ship from observation of its wake. Their prevail-
ing philosophy is that of semper idem. It is "an
established rule to abide by former precedents,...
because the law in that case being solemnly declared
and determined, what before was uncertain and per-
haps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule,
which it is not in the breast of any judge to alter
or vary from..." 2
Hence to learn the formal common law is not
necessarily to learn the needs of social conditions
and the science of change, even though its various
rules were originally the effect of social needs.
Rather, it was, in the exaggerated though pictur-
esque charge of North Carolina's chief justice, "to
invoke the spirits of long departed fools;" to travel
in search of a rule from Coke to Croke, and from
there to the Dome Books; to go from Ignotum or
Ignotius in the inverse ratio of philosophy and rea-
son only to reach eventually some barren source of
pedantry and quibble.
Knowledge of the common law, therefore, re-
quired learning in the black-letter Latin and the
1. John Cooke, "Vindication of the Professors and Profession of
the Law." (1646.) He also complained that "Lawyers, being a bold
and talkative kind of men, will intrude themselves into the Chairs in
all Committees, where (being accustomed to take fees) they will under-
hand protect delinquents, and their conceiled estates with tricks and
devices."
2. Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 69.
S. Clark, "Some Myths of the Law," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 26.
Norman-French in which long dead decisions had
been written. Imagine, for instance, an unlettered
student searching for the common lAw in such
phraseology as this :--"Richardson, C. S. de C. B.
at assizes at Salisbury in Summer 1631, fuit assault
per Prisoner la condemne pur Felony;-que puis
son condemnation ject un Brickbat a le dit Justice,
que narrowly mist. Et pur ceo immediately fuit
Indictment drawn pur Noy envers le Prisoner, et
son dexter manus ampute et fixe al Gibbet, sur que
luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de
Court'"
The common law has required learning also in
Anglo-Saxon and in German, that principles might
be carried to remote sources and compared with
others. Above all, of course, it required knowledge
in general of what preceding judges had decided
and had said. It required also a certain forensic
ability, skill in dialectics, and ingenuity, as Bacon
says, "to beat over matters, and to call up one
thing to prove and illustrate another."
But formal knowledge of the common law, as
a law of precedent, did not require, nor in a very
prevalent philosophy does it now necessitate, any
knowledge of that science of actual conditions in-
cluded in so-called economics, sociology, criminol-
ogy and the like. For that reason, the learning
which went with mere knowledge of the common
law wars too topical in itself to accomplish the mak-
ing of a statesman and it still is so.
This is equally true of course of knowledge of
medicine or of automobile repairing or of any other
"confined and topicall" kind of learning. No such
technical education is in and of itself sufficient to
the needs of real statesmanship. But doctors and
boiler-makers and other men of a topical learning
do not ordinarily undertake the work of statesmen.
They may on occasion be elected to fill such a po-
sition, but they do not assume the function as an
integral part of their profession. In theory, law-
yers have been in the same category. They were
not supposed to be statesmen; except by special'
appointment. Therefore, the allegation that they
were not educated as statesmen, while true enough,
was after all not particular condemnation. Even
today lawyers are theoretically not statesmen be-
cause of their profession, and they are not neces-
sarily educated as statesmen.
But in fact lawyers do assume the duties of
statesmen as a function of their profession. Un-
consciously, perhaps, and unpretentiously always,
lawyers are constantly remoulding the old rules of
law and making new rules to meet the changing
needs of social and economic conditions. They, the
4. Parenthetically, it may be said that le dit justice possessed a
sense of humor despite his tolerance of the language of the law. He
ducked the brick-hat, but it took off his hat. He is said to have remarked,
thereupon. "You see now, if I had been an upright judge, I had been
slain." Campbell's "Lives of the Chief Justices," 1I, 20.
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lawyers of today-because they are the motivating
force behind the judges and of them are the judges
-are in fact and indisputably legislators.
If one doubts this fact, let him look at ,the
decision in Parks v. Pie Co.,5 wherein the court im-
posed on manufacturers of food an arbitrary re-
sponsibility for its wholesomeness, regardless of
fault. The defendant company was a manufacturer
of pies. The plaintiff had purchased a pie, not from
the company itself, but from a grocer who sold it
in the course of business. The plaintiff was in-
jured by some toxin in the pie. He sued the pack-
ing company, in tort, for damages. If he had shown
any negligence on the company's part, the case
would have been simple and clearly within the long
established rules of precedent.6  But there was no
showing of any negligence whatever on the part of
the defendant. On the contrary there was undis-
puted evidence of great care on its part. On these
facts there was no judicial custom of precedent
which made the manufacturer liable. Nevertheless,
for the sake of what it considered to be public pol-
icy, the court held the defendant to be liable, say-
ing, "Practically, he must know it is fit or take the
consequences if it proves destructive."
7
A very similar illustration is the decision in
Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co. Here the plaintiff had
been injured by biting on a nail embedded in a
piece of cake manufactured by the defendant. She
had not bought the cake from the defendant, but
from an independent dealer who had himself pur-
chased outright from the defendant. There was,
therefore, no contractual relation between the par-
ties. The court held the manufacturer liable, on
the theory that he had "warranted" to whomsoever
should eat the cake that it was wholesome. Now
a "warranty" is generally considered to be a con-
tract.' In this view of it there could not possibly
have been a warranty by the defendant to the plain-
tiff because there was no contract relation between
them. There is, however, a line of decisions which,
treat a warranty as a statement of fact on which,
if false, an action for deceit will lie.10 In this sense
there might have been an implied warranty by the
manufacturer. But whichever theory is followed,
the courts have fairly consistently held that a war-
ranty is personal to the buyer and cannot be taken
advantage of by a sub-purchaser."' The fact is
obvious, therefore, that in holding the manufacturer
liable, even though they used a well recognized
phraseology, the court in reality departed from
precedent and imposed on the manufacturer such
5. 03 Kan. 334; L. R. A. 1915 C 179
6. As to the right of a remote buyer to sue the 'manufacturer for
negligence, see 15 Mich. L. Rev. 672; 18 id. 436, 711.
7. Compare this with Mr. justice McKenna's, "It seems to me to
be of the very foundation of right-of the essence of liberty as it is of
morals--to be free from liability if one is free from fault." Arizona
Copper Co. v. Hammer, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558. This was the basis of
the decision in Ives V. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271.
8. 182 N. Y. S. 459.
9. "A warranty, therefore, being a contract requires. like all other
contracts, a consideration to supvort it." Benjamin on Sales, 7th ed.,
p. 663. ,Velshausen v. Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231. "without a contract
there can be no warranty." Jackson v. Watson & Sons [1909], 2 K. B.
193.
10. Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 8. Johnson
v. McDaniel. 15 Ark. 109; Ives v. Carter, 24 Conn. 392; Carter v.
Glass. 44 Mich. 154.
11. Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352; Tomlinson v.
Armour Packing Co., 75 N. 1. L. 748; Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Assn.,
211 Mass. 449; Prater v. Campbell. 110 Ky. 23; Crigger v. Coca Cola
Co., 132 Tenn., 545; Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga 782; Gearing v.
Berkson, 223 Mass. 257.
Contra, a recent tendency in line with the Chysky case, Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622; Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co.,
171 N. C. 33; Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52.
a responsibility as they believed public policy to
require.
Thus the courts have impaled the manufac-
turer upon two new points as it were. One is a
novel proposition of liability without fault, the
other an epithetical recasting of the old doctrine
of warranty. The old rules are changed. Now, if
the manufacturer escapes the pragmatic proposition
that he is liable as "insurer" of his products, he is
still held on the proposition that his is a peculiar
"warranty" which runs not only to his promises,
but to all the world as well.
2
Further illustration is found in the answers to
the question whether manufacturers can legally
control the price at which their goods shall be re-
sold by dealers. Recently the Supreme Court flatly
reversed its previous rulings in this regard and held
that such control was not legal. They upset their
earlier rule because their conception of public policy
so required. The supreme court of New Jersey,
however, even after this action of the United States
Supreme Court, took a different view of what public
policy required and declared such control to be
legal.
In People v. Williams, '" for other example,
the court held a certain statute to be unconstitu-
tional and void. Later on the court gained some
knowledge of actual conditions and an insight into
public needs, and in People v. Schweinler Press3
it used this knowledge as a cause for reversing its
earlier decision and held a similar statute to be
valid.
Recently, a district court 6 declared a federal
tax, destructive of goods produced by child labor,
to be unconstitutional, although in McCray v,
United States17 a similar tax destructive of colored
oleomargarine was upheld. To some extent, though
indirectly, the later decision is predicated upon so-
ciological conditions.
The decisions for which Chief Justice Marshall
is so justly lauded were not decisions pointed out
to him by precedent. They were judgments of
policy. Had a man of different experience and
other ideals been chief justice-a Jeffersonian, for
instance, believing in states' rights and popular con-
trol-the subsequent history of this nation might
have been utterly different. But it was not Mar-
shall the "common lawyer," deeply versed in prece-
dent and trained in law, who thus directed the
course of the nation. It was Marshall the states-
man, reacting to his own personal experience with
the incompetency of state governments and the
injustice of popular opinion.
Examples of this sort of judicial legislation
may be multiplied indefinitely if one so desires.
Many more changes in law, that is to say in
judicial custom, are made by judges, actually, but
under cover of mouth honor to the old rule. Hack-
er's Appeal is a good illustration although not pre-
cisely an example.18  The legal question was
whether or not a certain power had been properly
12. As to the development of the implied warranty of "Vholesomner,
which is itself a judicial creation to meet social needs, see 18 Mich. L.
Rev. 316.
13. See 19 Mich. L. Rev. 265.
14. 189 N. Y. 131.
15. 214 N. Y. 395.
16. George v. Bailey 274 Fed. 639. The opinion ignores the
McCray case and rests the decision on Hammer v. Dogenhart, 247 U. S.
251, which was obviously a pragmatic conclusion.
17. 195 U. S. 27, discussed in 6 Mich. L. Rev. 277.
18. 121 Pa. 192.
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exercised. The will creating the power required it
to be exercised by an instrument signed and
"sealed." The writing by which it was alleged to
have been exercised was signed, but had no seal-
in any conventional definition of the word. There
was, however, following the signature, a small pen
mark one-sixteenth of an inch long such as the
signer had used to indicate a period in other parts
of the instrument. It had previously been held in
other states that nothing was a "seal" unless it
were an impression in wax."5 Even Pennsylvania
had held that at least a "scroll" was necessary.2"
The court greatly desired to give effect to the in-
strument, but it could not declare a seal unneces-
sary, because the will creating the power expressly
required a seal. The court therefore gave mouth
honor to the requirements of the will, actually dis-
regarded it, and declared the small, adventitious
pen mark to be a "seal." The real reasons as given
was that the world has outgrown the necessities of
an age when seals were of practical importance.
The court could not openly and frankly disregard
the obligation-not of the law, in this case, but
of the will-so it evaded it in fact, by pretense, on
the justification of changed sociological conditions.
Not all of this judicial change in rule is so
sudden as in the examples given. In fact, most of
it is slow. As Mr. Justice Holmes remarked,
judges being precluded from making law by molar
action do it by molecular action.21 The important
fact, however, and the point here stressed, is that
they do change old rulings and make new ones,
and they do it for pragmatic reasons, out of regard
of changing economic and social conditions.
It may be argued that these unprecedented de-
cisions are technically and accurately not legisla-
tion, but that they are only judicial application of-
long established fundamental principles to new
economic and social facts. Rylands v. Fletcher, 2'
for instance, declared a principle of liability with-
out fault. It may be said that Yost v. Pie Co. was
only an application of that doctrine to new business
conditions. The writer is willing to grant this for
the sake of argument. But whether these decisions
be considered legislation, determination of public
policy, or the application of existing principles to
new facts, the question raised is the same.
Can the public policy be so wisely determined,
or the social factor be so .soundly eval uated by an
intelliger.r, man not trained in the social sciences,
as by an equally intelligent man who has been
trained in the theories by which sound public pol-
icy is deduced and the real needs of social and eco-
nomic conditions are judged?
One may, of course, take the arbitrary position
that there is nothing to the alleged social sciences;
that the welfare of the community is wholly a
matter of empiricism and that any intelligent man
is as competent to act upon the physical facts as
is any other man howsoever trained. Certainly it
has been something of a fashion to doubt the real
worth of all but the "natural" sciences. "One can
19. Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 239.
20. Duncan v. Duncan, 1 Watts (Pa.) 322.
21. "1 recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legis-
late, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar
to molecular actions." So. Pac. Co. v. Jennsen, 244 U. S. 205, 221.
22. L. R 3 H. of L. 330.
not but feel a little queasy when he uses the ex-
pression 'social science,' because it seems as if we
had not yet got aiiywhere near a real science of
man." "Aristotle's treatises on astronomy and
physics, and his notions of 'generation and decay'
and of chemical processes, have long gone by the
board, but his politics and ethics are still re-
vered."23
But if this argument be sound, what becomes
of "law" in the sort of decision under discussion?
There is not the law of precedent behind them for
they are, openly or covertly, without any prece-
dent,-decisions justified by "public policy." If
then it be insisted that there are no rules for ascer-
taining what constitutes public policy, if there is
no social science from which it can be deduced, if
it truly be, as may be urged, altogether a matter of
personal, individual opinion, then these are indis-
putably decisions not based on law or rule of any
sort, but resting wholly in the will of the judge
who renders them. They can no more be judg-
ments according to law than were those of the cadis
of Haroun al Raschid. This may not be undesirable
under the circumstances, but at least the fact must
be fairly faced.
On the other hand, however, it is not at all
impossible that much lack of social and economic
progress and much evil therein are due wholly to
the very idea that such progress can properly be
left to mere intelligent and opportune empiricism.
Lack of study and training in scientific theory con-
cerning these matters may account for many of
the existing evils. The same author from whom
the last quotation was taken goes on to say,
"Human affairs are in themselves far more intri-
cate and perplexing than molecules and chromo-
somes. But this is only the more reason for bring-
ing t6 bear on human affairs that critical type of
thought and calculation for which the remunerative
thought about molecules and chromosomes has pre-
pared the way."
If in fact there is anything in socio-economic
science which can aid a judge in properly applying
old principles to new facts, if there are laws by
which to adjudge the wisdom of one social rela-
tion or another, if there is any guide to proper
legislation in .the data collected-and who is pre-
pared flatly to deny it?-that science is essential,
imperative learning for those who assume to guide
the progress of the comronwealth.
The moral, therefore, is simple. knowledge of
the law of precedent and statute may possibly equip
lawyers to fill their own purses, but it alone does
not fit them to serve the public in the way that their
profession requires them to serve. It gives them
but a partial and imperfect background for judg-
ment and sound statesmafiship. Hence, somewhere
in his education, for the sake of the public whom
he assumes to serve, every lawyer must be trained
in that further knowledge which is requisite to safe
guidance of our social future.
23. Robinson, Mind in the Making, p. 7.
24. The writer personally believes that a lawyer who does 'not
himself understand the theories by which public policing is properly de-
termined, or the standards by which the effect of social factors is to
be weighed is not equipped to predict and persuade judicial action suffi-
ciently for even his own financial success.
